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Patriots and Terrorists: Reconciling Human Rights
With World Order
by Nicholas N. Kittrie*
I. INTRODUCTION
Whenever an IRA bomb explodes in Northern Ireland, an Arab
assassin's bullet takes the life of a school child in Israel, a Puerto Rican
Liberation Front explosion rips apart a commercial airliner, a Spanish
official is executed by local Basque separatists, or a Turkish diplomat in
France is shot by Armenian blood revengers-the world community once
again faces the dilemmas posed by political violence. There are those who
condemn resorting to violence as a means for political protest or change,
and assert that political motives should not excuse a person from criminal
responsibility. In the eyes of those who condemn violence, countries
which are willing to provide safe havens for political terrorists are acces-
sories to terror. There are others who characterize politically motivated
activists as a distinct category--entitled to special consideration by the
world community. In the latter view, those engaged in political violence
should be treated as legitimate combatants, much the same as warring
nations treat each other's soldiers. Looming in the background of these
conflicting positions is the international law of extradition.' It is this law
which, more than a century ago, gave recognition to the special status of
the political offender--exempting him from extradition for his political
crimes. Therefore, the current debate about political violence, the moral
and legal status of the political offender assumes a central role.
II. POLITICAL CRIMzs: FROM SACRILEGE TO "SOCIAL COMPACT"
Throughout ancient history and the Middle Ages and as long as the
doctrine of the divine and absolute right of kings furnished the philo-
sophical legitimacy for the governments of Europe, treason and other of-
fenses against the sovereign and his political order were invariably view&l
* Professor of Law, the American University-, Director Institute of Law and the Mass
Media; Chairman, Center for Law and Policy; LL.B Kansas University; LL.M. Georgetown
Law Center; S.J.D. Georgetown Law Center.
For a general discussion of the international law of extradition see, I. SmAam, Ex-
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as the most despicable of all crimes. With the 18th century arrival of the
Age of Reason, however, new perspectives were advanced regarding the
relationship between the ruler and the citizenry under him. The tradi-
tional notion of the absolute ruler gave way to a new liberal philosophy
professing the people to be the ultimate holders of sovereign power and
viewing the ruler as being merely the recipient of such limited authority
as was delegated to him. The theory of government based on the "social
compact" of the people, which had the endorsement of such leading lib-
eral philosophers as Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Locke, implied the
constant need for the consent of the governed. Governments were con-
ceived as the agents of the people, not their masters. Governmental pow-
ers were limited by "constitutions" which, as a manifestation of the social
contract, defined the rights of government as well as the rights of the
governed. From these changed political doctrines flowed the conclusion
that the legitimacy of government was not absolute but only relative.2
It was this relativist image of government-a government deriving its
continuing authority from the support of the people and further limited
by higher requirements of lawfulness-that cast the political offender in a
newly favored position. Presenting himself as one to right the wrongs
committed by government, the political offender appeared to possess
overriding claims. He, much like the government in power, was claiming
to derive a mandate from the citizenry, however small his supporting
community might be. He, much like those in authority, was asserting
rights established by law. Indeed, while the incumbent regime might
often rely upon the rights of vested power and ancient law, the political
challengers would frequently assert "higher" rights derived from national
constitutions or from some "natural" and immutable law. No longer was
the political offender seen as an unrighteous and claimless and public en-
emy. He was viewed as a political opponent and competitor to the ex-
isting government, not as an enemy of the "real sovereign," the people.
To such a competitor certain courtesies had to be extended. Moreover,
the likelihood of a political turnover and a role reversal could not be ig-
nored. "Don't do unto your political enemy what you don't want done
unto you," was possibly the bottom line of the differential standards de-
veloped for political offenders during the second third of the 19th
century.
The philosophical and jurisprudential foundations of the benign atti-
tude towards the political offender were well illustrated in the writings of
Vidal, a leading French legal scholar:
... Whereas formerly the political criminal was treated as a public en-
emy, he is today considered as a friend of the public good, as a man of
2 B. INGRAHAM, POLITICAL CRIME IN EUROPE 78-83 (1979).
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progress, desirous of bettering the political institutions of his country,
having laudable intentions, hastening the onward march of humanity, his
only fault being that he wishes to go too fast, and that he employs in
attempting to realize the progress which he desires, means irregular,
illegal and violent. If from this point of view, the political criminal is
reprehensible and ought to be punished in the interest of the established
order, his criminality cannot be compared with that of the ordinary mal-
efactor, with the murderer, the thief, etc. It is only relative, dependent
on time, place, circumstances, the institutions of the land, and it is often
inspired by noble sentiments, by disinterested motives, by devotion to
persons and principles, by love of one's country. In conclusion, the crimi-
nality is often only passing; the author of a political crime who is rather
a vanquished, a conquered man, than a criminal, may become, as a result
of a revolution favorable to his ideas, the conqueror of the morrow, who
is called regularly and lawfully to direct and guide the state and the pub-
lic administration of his country. The penal reaction exercised against
him is not at all, then, like that against malefactors, who violate the law
in which case it is a work of social defense against an attack upon imma-
nent conditions of human existence but is rather a work of the defense of
caste, of political parties, against an attack upon an organization and
upon a political regime historically transitory.8 (author's emphasis)
The political turmoil and changes of 19th century Europe contributed
heavily to the new perspective on political dissenters and rebels. No
longer were political dissent and revolution viewed as morally reprehensi-
ble and outrightly condemned by prevailing political philosophies. As
prominent a group as the Fathers of the American Revolution articulated
in their Declaration of Independence the right of revolution whenever the
government failed to accord the governed their due. Under political liber-
alism, rebellion was permissible if it represented the will of the popular
majority and was undertaken for a just cause. Thomas Jefferson, a prag-
matic political leader, even went so far as to suggest that rebellion should
often be used in order to keep the democratic process and the people's
rights vital and vibrant.'
III. THE PRIVILEGE OF BEING POLITICAL
It was pursuant to the altered philosophies and realities that both
the domestic laws of Europe and the international law of extradition set
out to accord the political offender a more lenient treatment. "The
French Revolution of 1789 and its aftermath," writes Cherif Bassiouni,
3 VIDAL, COURS DE DROIT CRIMINAL ET DE SCIENCE PENTENTIAIRE, 110-12 (5th ed. 1916),
reprinted in Ferrari, Political Crime, 20 Colum. L. Rev. 312-13 (1920).
"I like a little rebellion now and then .... The tree of liberty must be refreshed from
time to time with The blood of patriots and tyrants." 2 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His
TIME 158, 166 (1951).
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"started the transformation of (political crime which) . . . was the extra-
ditable offense par excellence to what has since become the nonex-
traditable offense par excellence." The first explicit international limita-
tion upon the extradition of political offenders appeared in the 1834
treaty between France and Belgium.6 One year earlier, the same principle
was enunciated in the domestic law of Belgium, and was contained also in
an exchange of notes between France and Switzerland." In 1843, France
and the United States ratified a treaty exempting from extradition per-
sons accused of "any crime or offense of a purely political character."8 In
subsequent years, the differentiation between conventional and political
offenders became a worldwide extradition standard and also resulted in
special considerations for political offenses in domestic law. Solzhenitsyn
reported the treatment of political offenders under the regime of the Rus-
sian czar:
It was almost a crime to mix politicals with criminals! Criminals were
teamed up and driven along the streets to the station so as to expose
them to public disgrace. And politicals could go there in carriages...;
politicals were not fed from the common pot but were given a food allow-
ance instead and had their meals brought from public eating houses. The
Bolshevik Olminsky didn't want even the hospital rations because he
found the food too coarse.'
The 20th century saw a decline in the previous tolerance toward the use
of extra-legal measures for the attainment of political change. The politi-
cal offender continued to retain the special privileges preyiously acquired
in the international arena-but that was mainly due to the sense of na-
tional pride and political rivalries manifested in the relations between na-
tions. On the continent, the search for political stability slowly and finally
resulted in a total erosion of the political offender exception in domestic
law. Middle-of-the-road governments, dependent upon fragile coalitions
of divergent parties for survival, were no longer willing to pay the heavy
price for dissenting political views.
The American political system, which was originally established
through revolution, came of age and substituted a dedication to peaceful
transformation for the older flirtation which change through revolution-
ary means. American political philosophy, reinforced by the active re-
formist role assumed by the judiciary under the newly discovered concept
C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 370-71 (1974).
0 Extradition Treat, Nov. 22, 1834, France-Belgium, art. 5, 6 Recueil des Traites
(France) 278, 84 Perry's T.S. 456.
' Law of October 1, 1833 (1980) Les Codes Belges II 429 (Belgium).
' Convention for the Surrender of Criminals U.S.-France, entered into force April 13,
1844, 8 Stat. 580, T.S. No. 89.
9 A. SOLZHONITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 499-500 (1973).
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of judicial review, increasingly began to view revolution as obsolete and
morally reprehensible. The American Constitution, with its panoply of
checks and balances designed to curb governmental abuse, was being
pointed to as an effective substitute for the resort to revolution in the less
perfected political systems. So viewed, the constitutional system not only
allows for the full expression of the majority will, but also guarantees that
all just causes, and such causes only, will be pursued by the government.
Given the state of harmony produced by what is described as the Ameri-
can constitutional miracle, no justification for revolution could be envi-
sioned. 10 This outlook, in fact, replaces the old and discarded doctrine of
divine and absolute sovereign legitimacy with a new absolute theory-the
theory of constitutional perfection, holding that the self-correcting proce-
dures under the constitution obviate the need, and therefore abolish the
citizens' right, to resort to extra-legal measures of reform.
The new totalitarian regimes, which rose on the European Continent
during the agonizing years between the two World Wars, similarly found
little use for the tolerance of political offenders. First Soviet Communism,
and later Italian Fascism and German Naziism set out to establish their
own corrupt versions of the utopian absolutes. Unlike America, which felt
it had discovered the procedures for attaining ultimate goodness, the So-
viets and Nazis claimed to have established the ultimate and perfect so-
cial, economic and political order. Opposition to or reform of such ulti-
mate order was neither needed nor tolerated. Dissenters were either ill or
evil. Having failed to recognize the absolute perfection of the newly insti-
tuted Soviet or Nazi order, the offenders against it were to be stringently
dealt with, much like the offenders against the divine and absolute sover-
eigns of old.11
In these new and confident societies which believe themselves to have
discovered the ideal utopian sociopolitical order or the ideal procedures
for attaining such order, the political offender has no redeeming social
value. He appears from time to time merely as an apparition to challenge
the perfection of those in power.
IV. THE PROTECTION OF NEW INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS
Just as the fortunes of the political offender seem to have reached
their lowest point, new sources of support have suddenly manifested
themselves. These have been derived drom the rapid expansion of inter-
national law which began to recognize the new principles of self-determi-
nation and human rights. While the political offender of the 19th century
10 A. ULAM, THE UNIFINISHED REVOLUTION 282 (1960).
" Kittrie, Reconciling The Irreconcilable: The Quest for International Agreement
Over Political Crime and Terrorism [1978] Y.B. WORLD AFF. 208, 214 (1978).
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could base his claims to legitimacy upon domestic law or upon the ill-
defined and not generally recognized "higher" principles of natural law,
his 20th century counterpart has had the support of growing prestige and
sometimes the commanding power of an expanding law of nations. The
First World War ended with a commitment of the victorious nations to
the right of self-determination for those who have been under the yoke of
others. The establishment of self-government in the newly created na-
tions of Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Czechoslovakia, was the
first step in the implementation of this commitment. The creation of the
League of Nations' mandates system, committed to preparing colonial
people for eventual self-rule, gave additional impetus to the growth of
nationalism among the colonial nations of Asia and Africa. The move-
ment which commenced with President Wilson's Fourteen Points reached
its peak in the post-Second World War era.12 Some manifestations of the
new commitment have been reflected in actual positive international law.
One example of the attempt to implement the international promise of
self-determination was the 1960 United Nations General Assembly Decla-
ration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples. 13 But the climate of public opinion in the world community has cer-
tainly supported the most expeditious route to self-determination.
When a political activist seeks to pursue this goal, and in the process
finds himself labeled and prosecuted as a criminal under the domestic law
of the repressing regime, it is international principles which he pleads in
justification to the world community. The political offender thus ceases to
be the exclusive business of the country which he denounces or of the rule
against which he rebels. The political offender, if indeed in the pursuit of
the new international standards, becomes the spokesman and agent of the
community of nations.
The conclusion of the Second World War also witnessed a renewed
innernational commitment to the world-wide protection and promotion of
individual and communal human rights. In 1948, the General Assembly of
the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. ' In the following quarter of a century a host of other proclama-
tions, declarations, conventions and convenants have been advanced by
the United Nations, dealing with such topics as economic, social and cul-
tural rights, civil and political rights, racial discrimination, slavery, collec-
tive bargaining by workers, rights of children and the right of asylum. 5
" See generally, R. SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
(1973).
13 G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4686 (1960).
" G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/1311 (1948).




While these expressions have been neither uniformally accepted nor
shared on an equal legal status, they have nevertheless left an indelible
mark on world opinion. Even stronger undertakings for the advancement
of human rights have come into being on a regional basis. The European
Convention on Human Rights and its enforcement process are notable
examples. 6
It is evident that self-determination and other advancements of fun-
damental human rights and freedoms have become a major goal of the
international community and its jurisprudence in the post-United Na-
tions Charter era. How is this community and its law to respond to indi-
viduals and groups who insist on the actual and immediate implementa-
tion of these rights? A climate of escalated expectations has been created.
Those deprived of self-determination such as the Latvians, Lithuanians
and Estonians were coerced into merging into the Soviet Union at the end
of World War II and have been demanding the right to rule themselves.
Those without the right to freely depart and return to the countries of
their residence-such as the Jews, the Sakharovs and the Rastopoviches
of Russia-are calling out for this freedom. Those denied liberty or equal-
ity for reasons of race or religion-the blacks of South Africa, the Asians
in Idi Amin's Uganda and the Chinese in Indonesia-demand relief.
Those distinct communities which are denied the full opportunity to cul-
tivate their culture or language-such as the Kurds of Iraq and the Arabs
of Iran-expect the world's understanding and support. Those who wish
effective regional self-rule-the Basques in Spain, the Welsh in the
United Kingdom or the Bretons in France-are demanding what they be-
lieve to be their acknowledged right. When all or any of these rights are
outrightly denied by law or practice, or when effective procedures for
their attainment have been frustrated, what relief may be sought by those
aggrieved? Will the offending regime's labeling as "criminals" those op-
posed to its own transgressions suffice in the eyes of world opinion and
international law to make such designations stick? Must not the interna-
tional community display its support for those acting on behalf of its pro-
claimed principles? Is it desirable to demand that those who exercise
their internationally recognized rights be accorded, as "political offend-
ers," differential treatment in domestic and international law? Or, should
the principle be extended further to believe totally from the label of crim-
inality those who responsibly exercise their rights under internationally
established charters, declarations and covenants?
" See generally, Robertson, The United Nations Covenent on Civil and Political
Rights and The European Convention On Human Rights, [1969] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 21;
O'Hanlon, The Brussels Colloquy on the European Convention on Human Rights, 5 IRISH
JUR. 252 (1970); Comto, The Application of *the European Convention on Human Rights in
Municipal Law, 4 J. INT'L COMMISSION OF JUR. 94 (1962).
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The questions raised by acts of individual or group resistance to na-
tional laws and practices violative of international rights and standards
are not theoretically posed. These are questions which have been brought
increasingly often before judicial and administrative tribunals in cases of
requested extradition, and in other instances as well. A Jew being taken
to the Nazi gas ovens assassinates his guard and escapes abroad. Is he
subject to a German extradition request on a charge of murder? An Arab
youth in Hebron participates in a violent demonstration against the Is-
raeli authorities, demanding the establishment of an independent Pales-
tinian state. Several Israeli police officers are injured and the youth is
apprehended and sentenced to 90 days in jail for assaulting an officer.
When the youth later applies for immigration to the United States, will
he be disqualified by the American authorities on the basis of his criminal
record? A Russian Tartar, dissatisfied with the ethnic, cultural and reli-
gious discrimination against his people, decides to illegally cross the bor-
der from Soviet Georgia into Turkey. A member of a local Russian
Kholhoz, dedicated to the Marxist cause, notices him and attempts to
alert the Soviet border guards. A struggle ensues and the local Marxist is
left injured by the escaping Tartar. Will extradition be granted for the
dissenter's aggravated assault upon the loyal Russian Kholhoznik?
V. POLITICAL OFFENSES: FROM HEROISM TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
The international movement for self-determination and human rights
has added a great measure of support for the 19th century doctrines ad-
vocating the differential treatment of political offenders. But at the same
time, a totally distinct development in international law has been taking
place, one which may produce the virtual demise of the political of-
fender's favored status. This latter development has evolved from the ma-
turing and steady growth of international criminal law.
In the post-Second World War era, several drastic restrictions were
placed on the benefits of -the political offense claim. World revulsion
against Nazi and Fascist atrocities resulted in the Nuremberg tribunal's
affirmation of both crimes against the peace and war crimes as interna-
tional offense exceptions. The Nuremberg trial, and the subsequent refor-
mulation of its principles by the United Nations General Assembly in
1947,17 established for the first time that crimes against humanity were to
be universally condemned. In the recent past, after a discussion of the
South African practice of apartheid, the General Assembly designated it
to be "a crime against humanity."18
" G.A. Res. 177, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
is G.A. Res. 2823, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.30) 25, U.N. Doc. A/3730 (1972).
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The Genocide Convention of 1948" similarly sought to protect na-
tional, ethnic, racial and religious groups by defining as an international
crime the killing of members of a group, causing them serious bodily or
mental harm, or deliberately inflicting upon them conditions of life calcu-
lated to bring physical destruction. In addition, the Genocide Convention
specifically prohibited genocide and related crimes from qualifying as po-
litical offenses and urged all states to grant extradition of those charged
with such crimes.
As more offenses were being recognized, not only as contrary to the
well-being of one country but as threats against the welfare of all man-
kind, the "international crime" category continued to expand. The origins
of international criminal law date back to the crime of piracy, long con-
sidered an offense against all civilized nations.2 0 Other early international
efforts concentrated upon white slavery and traffic in narcotics. But, in
more recent years, there has been a growing international commitment to
limit, through a process of international criminalization, conduct which
otherwise could be viewed as political yet which, because of its threat to
the basic institutions of the world community, could no longer be allowed
the political offense benefits. The definition of counterfeiting as an inter-
national crime after the First World War was such a step." Even more
demonstrative of the world community's willingness to condemn political
violence has been the recent conventions making aircraft hijacking22 and
the kidnapping of diplomats (internationally protected persons) interna-
tional crimes.2 8 Thus condemned by international law, a growing list of
crimes can no longer be viewed as political offenses affording their perpe-
trators protection from extradition. Instead, the international crime des-
ignation increasingly makes it the positive duty of all civilized nations to
apprehend those charged with such crimes and subject them to either ex-
tradition or prosecution.
Gradually, the political offense category has been declining. In partic-
1" The Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of The Crime of Genocide, G.A.
Res. 260 A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
,o See, Convention of the High Seas entered into force Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
21 International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, Signed
April 20, 1929, 112 L.N.T.S. 372.
" See Convention for The Safety of Civil Aviation, done Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565,
T.I.A.S. No. 7570; Convention for The Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192; Convention on Offenses and Certain Other
Acts Committed On Boaad Aircraft, done Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768,
704 U.N.T.S. 219.
" Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism that are of International Signif-
icance, adopted Feb. 2, 1971, reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, 255 (1971); Conven-
tion on The Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Per-
sons, G.A. Res. 3166, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
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ular, with regard to activities that endanger the institutions which are
indispensable for the conduct of international relations and trade (i.e.
diplomatic security and safety of aviation), the world's nations have been
willing to forego their political differences in order to join in the abolition
of the political offender benefits. The position of the political offender of
old-an enemy to some and a hero to others-is constantly being eroded.
Unless the trend is reversed, those portrayed as noble rebels in the previ-
ous century might become the blackest of all villains by the end of the
current century.
VI. BETWEEN RIGHTS AND CRIMES: WHENCE THE POLITICAL OFFENDER?
The post-Second World War era which gave recognition to new inter-
national rights on one hand, and formulated new international crimes on
the other hand, has had profound impact on the classification and status
of political offenders. Contradictions, as well as concurrences, between in-
ternational and domestic legal standards in the definition of political of-
fenses are becoming much more critical to international cooperation. In
the face of domestic denial of human rights to which the community of
nations has given recognition, in may countries political offenders may be
acting in conformity with recognized international rights even though in
violation of domestic laws. At the same time, other activities which were
once recognized as "political offenses," domestically as well as within the
community of nations, might now be turning into international crimes.
The political offender's crime, as previously seen, might range from
such "pure" and non-violent offenses as violations of laws restricting free-
dom of speech and travel, imposing censorship or apartheid, to a veritable
"siege of terror," involving random and indiscriminate terroristic violence
against an innocent and uninvolved population. What traditionally have
been defined in extradition law and practice as "pure" political of-
fenses-acts which challenge the State but affect no private rights of in-
nocent parties-continue to benefit from a privileged status in the inter-
national extradition law. One who commits treason, sedition or espionage
continues to be entitled to the political offender's protection from extra-
dition. Beneficiaries also include those who violate state laws limiting
freedom of speech or assembly, those who disregard censorship and other
secrecy laws and those who break laws restricting religion or other exer-
cises of human rights. For many of those in the "pure" offender category,
current continuation of the protection against extradition will not com-
pletely reflect the full measure of their entitlement. Pressure is mounting,
as evidenced by the United Nations condemnations of apartheid, racism
and colonialism, to lift the label of criminality from domestic conduct
which has involved nothing more than an assertion of internationally rec-
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ognized human rights.2 4 Part of what was once a political offense is thus
on the way to becoming an enforceable international as well as domestic
right.
On the other end of the political offense spectrum is a growing list of
activities which have been losing their political exemption and have be-
come universially condemned as international crimes. Included here are
crimes against humanity, genocide, aircraft hijacking and the kidnapping
of diplomats. Most conduct which has been so condemned internationally
might be classed either as "complex" or "connected" political offenses.
Genocide, crimes against humanity and offenses against diplomats might
be categorized as complex offenses. Aircraft hijacking and other offenses
against innocent victims would fall within the category of connected of-
fenses. It is clear that none of the activities which have come to be desig-
nated as international crimes constitute "pure" political offenses. What
the process of international criminalization reflects, by and large, is a uni-
versal reaffirmation of the classical commitment of international law to
the protection of transportation and communication routes, and the safe-
guarding of diplomatic personnel. The international law process also rep-
resents, to a lesser degree, an effort to narrow the classes of potential
victims of political violence and, thus, to protect the innocent.
There now remains an area in the center of the political offense spec-
trum which remains as yet unaffected by the growing recognition of
human rights on the one hand and the increasing expansion of interna-
tional crimes on the other. Typical of this range of conduct are what
might generally be regarded as "complex" or "connected" political of-
fenses. Some of these offenses might be committed domestically, some
transnationally. Complex political offenses such as the assassination of a
government official in the course of a political uprising, the bombing of
military or police headquarters and violent resistance to an arresting of-
ficer come within the class. Also included in this category of behavior are
such connected political offenses as bank robberies for the replenishing of
a revolutionary treasury, the kidnapping of a business executive for extor-
tion and the taking of hostages in order to have them exchanged for im-
prisoned political offenders. It is with regard to this wide range of con-
duct, in the middle spectrum between international rights and
international crimes, that uncertainty and ambivalence currently prevail
in the international community. Especially troublesome in this still un-
charted terrain are manifestations of contemporary political violence
which differ substantially from the traditional political offenses. Consider,
for instance, the indiscriminate use of violence against victims only mar-
ginally associated with an opposing political regime or party, or the as-
24 Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments, 1 supra.
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sault against such victims in neutral countries remote from the battle-
field. Consider a machine gun assault by Irish nationalists against a bus
carrying school children in Northern Ireland. Consider the massacre, by
Japanese collaborators with the Palenstine Liberation Organization, of
Christian pilgrims from Puerto Rico upon their arrival at Israel's Lod
Airport. How should such types of conduct be treated by the interna-
tional community?
The most comprehensive treaty for the prevention and punishment
of political violence was proposed by the League of Nations in 1937. Fol-
lowing the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia, at Marseilles
on October 9, 1934, the French Government urged the Council of the
League of Nations to prepare an international agreement for the suppres-
sion of terrorism. A committee of experts prepared a draft convention
which was later offered for signature.2 5
Viewing the League of Nations convention today, from the vantage
point of subsequent historical developments, the shortcomings of that ef-
fort are readily apparent. The attempted assassination of Hitler by dis-
gruntled German military leaders in 1944 and the successful execution of
Mussolini by anti-Fascist partisans in 1945 would have readily qualified
as internationally condemned terrorist acts under the proposed League
convention. Many of the post-Second World War liberation movements
in Asia and Africa would have been similarly defined as terroristic.
Broadcasting to an oppressed people to encourage them to rise against an
exploiting regime would have been condemned as an incitement to com-
mit international crime. It is little wonder that the 1937 document, capa-
ble of such bizarre interpretations, received so little support when offered.
The League of Nations convention was clearly predicated on the
maintenance of the pre-Second World War status quo. It displayed an
unblinking willingness to label all future revolutionary or national libera-
tion movements as terrorist. Such total commitment against all violent
political contests cannot be expected to succeed. As long as the world
consists of "haves" and "have nots," of those in power and those out of
power, of countries which permit gradual and peaceful changes and those
which prohibit them, a total disavowal of violence is visionary. Yet what
can be done about the terrorists' excesses of recent years?
VII. RECONCILING PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WITH WORLD ORDER
Recognizing the expanding boundaries of international crime and the
concurrent narrowing of the political offense exceptions, a viewer might
well conclude that the 19th century liberalism and tolerance for extra-
2 Convention for The Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 7 INT'L LEGIs. 862-78
(M. Hudson ed. 1941).
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legal dissent and activism is coming to an end. Aircraft hijacking and dip-
lomatic abduction are now designated as international crimes. The 1977
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism similarly excludes
kidnapping, hostage taking and firearm offenses from the definition of po-
litical offenses." Other tactics of violence are likely tob e internationally
outlawed on a case-by-case basis. Now that the end of colonialism is in
sight, even radical governments might be discovering that tolerance of
non-governmental violence, even for sympathetic causes, is too risky an
enterprise. Established regimes might be closing ranks in self-protection.
One committed to the further pursuit of collective as well as individual
political self-realization might therefore soon confront the central ques-
tion: within the confines of international legality, what may groups or in-
dividuals deprived of self-determination or other internationally recog-
nized rights do in the defense of their claims?
Others who observe current developments might focus on an alto-
gether different concern. Witnessing the continuing resurgence of indis-
criminate violence, and the existence, as well as emergence, of new safe
haven countries-unwilling to participate effectively or sincerely in inter-
national controls-it might be concluded that no more than lip service is
being paid to international cooperation. Taking notice of newly rising an-
gry minorities (ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural), and considering
evidence of retribalization within the modern nation-states, dire predic-
tions might be advanced of yet new waves of violence. The observer of
these trends would articulate his concern differently: given past failures
to define and proscribe terrorism, are there any prospects for the future
regulation and meaningful control of the excesses of political violence?
A reform of the international extradition standards applicable to po-
litical offenders promises reasonably broad and important results for the
limitation of excessive political violence. In the first place, such an ap-
proach avoids the arguments against a comprehensive anti-terrorism con-
vention as a tool of the "haves." It is evident that any proposed conven-
tion against political violence and terrorism which disregards the claims
and needs of the politically abused cannot hope for the necessary broad-
ranged support. The political offense exception, on the other hand, has its
clear origins in the protection of unorthodox dissent. Already built into
the exception is a sympathetic viewpoint of the political dissenter and
rebel. Using the exception as a point of departure is therefore desirable.
Moreover, a restructuring of this exception does not require a total
and absolute bar against all extra-legal methods of dissent. Instead, the
exception allows for the development of new and flexible standards for
judging extraditability. The political offender exception is well suited to
' European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, entered into force Oct. 25,
1978, art. 1, Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 93 ( 7390), Europ. T.S. NO. 90.
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serve as a balancing test. The motivation of the actor, the proportion of
violence utilized to the claimed wrong, and effects on innocent persons
have all been previously considered in applications for political offender
status. Implicit in any resort to a balancing test are principles already
known to all countries in their domestic handling of claims of self-
defense.
The decision to deal with the problem of excessive violence and ter-
rorism by means of the extradition exception has already been adopted
by the Council of Europe. In a 1974 resolution, the Committee of Minis-
ters pointed out that extradition is a particularly effective means for con-
trolling terrorism. The Council urged member-States in their response to
extradition requests to consider the particular seriousness of terrorist acts
which: (1) create a collective danger to life, liberty or safety; (2) affect
innocent persons alien to the motives behind the struggle; or (3) employ
cruel and vicious means. If extradition is refused in such serious in-
stances, prosecution by competent domestic authorities is required.
The narrowing of the political offense exception deals with only one
side of the problem, namely the excesses of political activism. The Euro-
pean Resolution falls short in not addressing itself more directly to the
rights of those engaged in legitimate assertions of self-determination and
human rights. In order to maintain a proper balance between human
rights and world order, it is imperative that the world community in re-
jecting the proposition that all forms of violence are justified if supported
by political goals, avoid the trap of supporting the other extreme, that
violent opposition to an established regime is never permissible by inter-
national standards. Consequently, the principles of self-defense and the
requirement of proportionality need to be re-examined, refined and in-
jected more vigorously into this area. s1
Those claiming the status of political offenders should be required to
circumscribe and limit their violent conduct. Acts of self-defense would
have to be addressed, as directly as possible, against those exercising the
state power, and should avoid all deliberate or careless harm to innocent
parties. The force used for such acts of self-defense should be appropriate
and proportionate to the harm imposed by the authorities, as well as to
the amount of force utilized by the authorities. If groups resorting to vio-
lence for political ends (and their supporters in the community of na-
tions) can be persuaded that their protection from extradition and inter-
national criminal prosecution, as well as their acquisition of some form of
legitimacy and recognition (i.e., prisoner of war status and civilian cloth-
ing in captivity) set their price in terms of moderation and restraint, the
27 For discussion of such an approach see, Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offense
and The Political Offense Exception in Extradition-A Proposed Juridical Standard for
The Unruly Problem, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 254-57 (1969).
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sparing of innocent people might be at hand.
To some international idealists and reformers such an endorsement
of individual or group self-help might appear questionable. But "acts of
resistance," even though utilizing extra-legal means, will be indispensable
as long as the international community lacks the means for the effective,
world-wide enforcement of fundamental human rights.

